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The Japanese American internment refers to the exclusion and subsequent
removal of approximately 112,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans, officially
classified as "persons of Japanese ancestry", from certain parts of the
United States during World War II to temporary relocation camps in the
nation's interior. The government of the United States officially apologized
for this action in the 1980s and has paid reparations, and claims for about
60 years to survivors.
While this action is most commonly referred to as internment, some argue
that relocation is a more appropriate term. The main arguments for this view
are (1) internment occurs in a prison; the Japanese Americans were not
required to stay in the camps and they were permitted to settle anywhere
outside the exclusion area; (2) an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 internees did
eventually settle outside the exclusion area; (3) the contemporaneous term
used by Roosevelt administration and the WRA was relocation center and
officials specifically distinguished the WRA camps from internment camps.
Many other things besides both internment and relocation are involved,
among them: individual and group exclusion from "military" zones,
deportation, illegal detainment, de-naturalization, alien enemy registration
requirements, curfews, travel restrictions, and property confiscation
(including seizures, freezing, bond seizure, and restrictions) for those of
foreign birth and/or of "enemy" ancestry.
Using different definitions of internment, you can arrive at different
numbers of those affected.
Only 9,009 people of Japanese ancestry from the US were interned under
the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 (50 USC 21-24), compared to a total of 23,435
internees from America. Of those 9,009, only 8,004 were from the continental
US.
Of all American citizens who were descended from "enemy" ancestry
(Italian, German and Japanese), the only recorded instances of American
citizens asking for renunciation of their citizenship were of Japanese
ancestry. 5,620 of these renunciants, who had asked to be repatriated to
Japan, were not included in the general internment totals (which would
otherwise be 14,629 out of 29,055 - not including any non-American
residents).
Internment is strictly limited to non-citizens, under the Alien Enemy
Act, however with governmental approval children and spouses who were
American citizens were allowed to also be interned with their relatives.
Luckily in almost all Japanese cases the children were permitted to go with
their parents, instead of being left to fend for themselves, or placed in
orphanages/foster homes.
The individual exclusion zones were particularly onerous, as they were
personally targeted, and very swift - allowing very little time to relocate.
Government agents continued to follow the excludees they couldn't convict of
crimes and warn potential new employers, police, and people of their new
towns on how "dangerous" they were.
For example in Korematsu's case the Japanese population had 5 days from
May 3, 1942 until 12 noon, May 8 (or 9th) to leave their hometown according
to General DeWitt's Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34.
During the period of 1939-1941, the FBI compiled the Custodial Detention
Index ("CDI") on citizens, enemy aliens and foreign nationals which might be
dangerous.
On June 28, 1940 the Alien Registration Act of 1940 (or Smith Act) is
passed, Section 31 required the registration and fingerprinting of aliens
above the age of 14, Section 35 required reports of change of address within
5 days. Registered aliens are to get back their Green cards, after form
processing. Within 4 months 4,741,971 registered at post offices around the
country. Of the 1.1 million aliens above the age of 14 who would be classed
as enemy aliens, 683,259 were males of which only 56,332 were Japanese.
The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 led many to suspect the
Japanese were preparing a full-scale attack on the West Coast. Further
attacks, such as the submarine shelling of an California oil refinery in
1942 redoubled these suspicions. Also, Japan's rapid military conquest of
much of Asia made their military machine seem to Americans frighteningly
unstoppable. Thus, the presence of about 100,000 ethnic Japanese on the West
Coast was considered a huge security risk.
Critics of the exclusion often claim that there was no military
justification for it as there are no cases of military espionage was ever
that has was ever attributable to Japanese-Americans. David Lowman has,
however, asserted the decryption of the MAGIC codes suggested to the
military and political leaders at the time that there was a vast spy network
of Japanese-Americans feeding information to Japan's war machine. His claims
have been controversial with others pointing out that much of the
information that the Japanese obtained may have come from public sources
such as newspapers, and that communications by Japanese consular officials
stating an attempt to recruit Japanese-Americans did not necessarily mean
that those attempts were successful. However, some of the intercepted
messages specifically said that the information had come from
Japanese-American spies. One captured Japanese officer who had graduated
from UCLA, and spoke fluent English specifically reported attempting to
cultivate contacts for such spying, as reported in a letter sent to
Congressman Wallop of Wyoming by a serviceman.
Commander Kenneth Ringle estimated that 25% of all Americans of Japanese
ancestry were of doubtful loyalty and that about 3,500 could be expected to
become espionage agents and sabotageurs.
Approximately 20,000 Japanese-americans in Japan at the start of the war
joined the Japanese war effort, and hundreds joined the Japanese Army.
Tomoya Kawakita, an American citizen who worked as an interpreter and a POW
guard for the Japanese army, actively participated in the torture (and at
least one death) of American soldiers, including survivors of the Bataan
Death March.
In January 25, 1942 the Secretary of War reported that "on the Pacific
coast not a single ship had sailed from our Pacific ports without being
subsequently attacked". Due to this espionage was suspected.
In addition to espionage, there was also concern that in the event of an
invasion there could be sabotage of both military and civilian facilities
inside the United States. For instance, California's water systems were
highly vulnerable, and there were concerns about arson, brush fires in
particular.
Administration and military leaders doubted the loyalty of ethnic
Japanese. Many, including some born in America, had been educated in Japan,
where school curricula emphasized reverence for the Emperor. Several
pro-Japan groups, such as the [[Black Dragon Society]], functioned both
inside and outside the camps, and pro-Japan riots occured in many camps,
which required moving some residents to Tule Lake (see below). 19,000
Japanese applied to be returned to Japan during the war. 94% of miltary-aged
men said they would not serve in the U.S. Armed Forces. Some, however, did
serve, in the famed 442nd regiment which operated in Europe (not Japan, as
some believe). Many of the American residents refused to take a loyalty oath
to America (or a promise to abide by American laws), which with the
exception of a reference to the Japanese Emperor, was the same as required
by draftees and war industry workers. There was no comprable refusal by
Germans, Italians or other Europeans living in America.
On December 7, 1941 Presidential Proclamations 2525 (German), 2526
(Italian) and 2527 (Japanese) were signed. Many homes were raided using the
CDI and other information, and hundreds of aliens were in custody by the end
of the day, including Germans and Italians (although war was not declared on
Germany or Italy until Dec 11). As of 11:AM, Dec 9th 1,801 aliens were in
custody, of which 1,221 were Japanese (376 of them in Hawaii) - the author
of that memorandum "did not believe there would be very many more arrests of
Japanese."
Only 6,056 of the 16,811 foriegners arrested in security measures by the
FBI between December 7, 1941 and June 30, 1945 were of non-European descent.
Presidential Proclamation 2537 issued on Jan.14, 1942, 1 million enemy
aliens register. Any change of address, employment or name had to be
reported to the FBI/DOJ. Enemy aliens were not allowed to enter restricted
areas. Violaters of regulations were subject to "arrest, detention and
internment for the duration of the war."
Executive Order 9066, signed by Franklin D Roosevelt on February 19,
1942, allowed military commanders to designate areas "which any or all
persons may be excluded, and with such respect to which, the right of any
person to enter, remain in, or leave...". These exclusion zones, unlike
internment, were applicable to both citizens and non-citizens. Eventually
such areas would include both the East and West Coasts, and about 1/3 of the
country, and were applied to all of those of Enemy Alien Ancestry (of which
the Japanese were a minority).
On March 2, 1942 General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 1,
applying to all those of enemy ancestry in areas of the West Coast were
required to file Change of Residence Notices. Subsequent proclamations
expanded the coverage all of California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada and Utah, and the southern portion of Arizona.
March 11, 1942 Executive Order 9095 created the Office of the Alien
Property Custodian giving it discretionary, plenary authority over all alien
property interests. Many assets were frozen, creating immediate financial
difficulty for the affected aliens.
March 27, 1942, by Proclamation No. 4, General DeWitt proclaimed as of
March 29, 1942 all Japanese and Americans of Japanese ancestry were
restricted from leaving Military Area No. 1, in order to ensure an orderly
migration.
May 9, 1942 most were forced from their homes.
Over 112,000 residents of Japanese ancestry were excluded from regions of
the US, however nearly 40% of those excludees were enemy aliens who should
have been interned, the remaining 67,000+ were US citizens by birth. The
last of these "subversives" was not removed until 11 months after Pearl
Harbor, 3 months after the last exclusion order was issued. The leisure with
which such orders were issued, and the fact that martial law was not
declared, leads to the conclusion that military necessity was not as urgent
as represented.
The Japanese internees were first sent to one of 17 temporary "Civilian
Assembly Centers," where most awaited shipment to a more permanent
relocation center. Some of those who did report to the civilian assembly
centers were not sent to relocation centers, but were released upon
condition that they remain outside the prohibited zone until the military
orders were modified or lifted. Almost 120,000 Japanese Americans and
resident Japanese aliens would eventually be removed from their homes in
California, western Oregon and Washington, and southern Arizona as part of
the single largest forced relocation in U.S. history. Only those of Japanese
ancestry were offered berths in the relocation centers, whereas the bulk of
the population of enemy ancestry effected by exclusion orders faced
immediate and mandatory resettlement with minimal assistance.
Many Japanese spent the next three years in one of ten "relocation
centers" across the country, which were run by the newly-formed War
Relocation Authority (WRA). Although 35,000 of them rapidly left for
portions of the US not in the exclusionary zones. Others would be held in
facilities run by the Department of Justice and the U.S. Army. Federal
officials attempted to conduct the massive relocation in a humane manner.
Most of these camps/residences, gardens, and stock areas were placed on
Native American reservations, for which the Native Americans were not
compensated, nor consulted about. The Native Americans consoled themselves
that they might at least get the improvements made to the land, but at the
end of the duration such buildings, and gardens were bulldozed or sold by
the government instead.
National Student Council Relocation Program, which only gave benefits to
Japanese relocatees, placed 4,300 individual scholarships to more than 500
colleges and universities located outside of the exclusionary zone.
Japanese Americans in Hawaii were not subject in the internment policy,
despite the fact that they were closer to essential military facilities than
most of the Japanese Americans in the western states. The main reason for
this is the colony was already virtually under martial law. Also, given that
about a third of the Hawaiian population was Japanese American, it is likely
that a wholesale detention of Japanese Americans in Hawaii would have
collapsed the local economy.
A key supporter of the internment was California Attorney General Earl
Warren.
In early 1944, the government began clearing individuals to return to the
West Coast. And on January 2, 1945, the exclusion order was rescinded
entirely, although the relocation camps remained open for residents who
weren't ready to make the move back. The fact that this occurred long before
the Japanese surrender (see V-J day), while the war was arguably at its most
vicious, weighs heavily against the charge that the relocation was simply
because of "racism".
The last internment camp was not closed until August 1948, although all
Japanese were cleared sometime in 1945.
One of the WRA camps, Manzanar, was designated a National Historic Site
in 1992 to "provide for the protection and interpretation of historic,
cultural, and natural resources associated with the relocation of Japanese
Americans during World War II" (Public Law 102-248).
Compensation
During the internment precautions were taken to protect the property of
those forced to move. The personal possessions of Japanese were indexed and
warehoused, and the owners issued receipts. Items requested would be shipped
to the camps free of charge. Farms were tended in their owners' absence, the
products sold, and the proceeds deposited in the proper bank accounts.
Despite this, however, many families still suffered heavy losses as a
result of the internment. A key contributor to their losses was California's
Alien Land Act, which prohibited non-citizens from owning property in that
state. Consequently, many of the Japanese American farmers were tenant
farmers and lost their rights to those farm lands. To compensate these
losses, the U.S. Congress ion July 2, 1948 passed the "American Japanese
Claims Act ", stated that all claims for war losses not presented within 18
months "shall be forever barred". Approximately $147 million in claims are
submitted, 26,568 settlements to family groups totalling more than $38
million are disbursed.
Only those of Japanese descent have been offered recompensation for
internment and relocation.
Some of the laws passed to reimburse them:
1951: PL 82-116 1952: PL 82-545 1956: PL 84-673 1960: PL 86-782
This settled the matterfor some time. However, a movement beginning
around the 1960s, largely focused on condemning America as a racist society,
pushed to reopen the issue and gain government apologies and further
reparations.
1972: PL 92-603 - Social Security adjustment.
The movement's first success was in 1976, when President Gerald Ford
proclaimed that the evacuation was "wrong".
1978: PL 95-382 - another Social Security adjustment.
In 1980, under Jimmy Carter, a commission was established by Congress to
study their matter. The ideological biases of this commission has been
questioned by some, with 40% of the commission staff being of Japanese
descent, some with vested financial interests. The commission's refusal to
address non-Japanese interment/relocation also weighed on their
impartiality. On February 24, 1983, they issued a report entitled Personal
Justice Denied condeming the internment.
These conclusions largely having become accepted, President [[Ronald
Reagan]] signed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 which provided redress of
$20,000 for each surviving detainee, totalling $1.2 billion dollars. Despite
congressional cries to individually determine worth, this was a straight
dole, and included about 3,500 Japanese who had renounced their citizenship
during the war and asked to be returned to Japan, and hundreds who live in
Japan today and have virtually no connection to the United States.
On September 27 1992: PL 102-371 (H.R. 4551) the Amendment of the Civil
Liberties Act of 1988, and an additional $400 million in benefits was signed
into law by President George H. W. Bush, who also issued another formal
apology from the U.S. government.
Terminology: Internment vs. Relocation
Most historical references refer to internment camps, although others
favor the name 'relocation camps'. Others, more critical of this action,
refer to them as detention camps or prisons.
Whatever name is used, the perimeters of many camps were lightly fenced
and guarded, and more so in the later war years. Camp administrations
eventually allowed relatively free movement outside the marked boundaries of
the camps. Still, all of the camps were in remote, desolate areas far from
any population centers.
As the war progressed, nearly a quarter of the internees left the camps
to live and work elsewhere in the United States, outside the exclusion zone.
Later in the war, some were authorized to return to the exclusion zone under
supervision of a sponsoring family or agency.
One of the camps, Tule Lake, was in fact later turned into a prison camp,
with watchtowers, fences, and guards. Tule Lake was reserved for those
Japanese who were specifically suspected of espionage, treason, or other
such disloyalty, and their families. Other famlies were held at Tule Lake
because they requested to be "repatriated" to Japan. A number of pro-Japan
demonstrations were held there throughout the war.
These camps are sometimes referred to as concentration camps, but the use
of this loaded term should not be construed to mean they were on the same
severity as Nazi Germany's extermination camps during the war.
Conditions in the camps
The relocation camps also had the highest live-birth rate and the lowest
death rate in the US during the wartime period.
Criticisms
The internment is widely condemned today, often attacked as racist.
People frequently cite it as a precedent for large-scale violations of civil
liberties, and a warning sign of what might happen again. However, others
defend it as a harsh necessity in a bitter and desperate war.
Former Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, who represented the US
Department of Justice in the "relocation," writes in the Epilogue to the
book Executive Order 9066: The Internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans
(written by Maisie & Richard Conrat):
The truth is as this deplorable experience proves
that constitutions and laws are not sufficient of themselves...Despite
the unequivocal language of the [[United States Constitution|Constitution of
the United States]] that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended,
and despite the Fifth Amendment's command that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, both of these
constitutional safeguards were denied by military action under Executive
Order 9066....
Some estimate that by the time the last relocation camps (except Tule
Lake) closed on December 1, 1945, the Japanese Americans had lost homes and
businesses estimated to be worth, in 1999 values, 4 to 5 billion dollars,
and that deleterious effects on Japanese American individuals, their
families, and their communities, went beyond monetary damages.
Other camps
Crystal City, Texas was an internment camp where together with Japanese,
Germans, enemy aliens from Latin America, and other people were interned as
well. During the war tens of thousands of Germans and Italians were also
detained, most of whom were foreign nationals or otherwise seen as
subversive.
Japanese Canadians were interned by their government during World War II.
See Japanese Canadian internment.
Legal Legacy
A number of significant legal decisions arose out of Japanese American
internment, relating to the powers of the government to detain people in
wartime. Among the cases which reached the Supreme Court were Yasui v.
United States (1943), Hirbayashi v. United States (1943), ex parte Endo
(1944) and Korematsu v. United States (1944). In Yashui and Hirabayashi, the
court upheld the constitutionality of curfews based on Japanese ancestry,
and in Korematsu, the court upheld the constitutionality of the exclusion
order. In Endo, the court accepted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
and ruled that the WRA had no authority to subject a citizen whose loyalty
was acknowledged to its procedures.
A number of legal scholars have expressed the opinion that these
decisions have taken on an added relevance in the context of the War on
terror.
List of internment camps
- Manzanar War Relocation Center
- Tule Lake War Relocation Center
- Heart Mountain War Relocation Center
- Minidoka War Relocation Center
- Topaz War Relocation Center
- Poston War Relocation Center
- Gila River War Relocation Center
- Granada War Relocation Center
- Rohwer War Relocation Center
- Jerome War Relocation Center
Documents of Interest
- Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1, 8 Fed. Reg. 982, provided for
detention of those of Japanese ancestry in assembly or relocation centers.
- House Report No. 2124 (77th Cong., 2d Sess.) 247-52
- Hearings before the Subcommittee on the National War Agencies
Appropriation Bill for 1945, Part II, 608-726
- Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942 (pg
309-327), by Lt. Gen. J. L. DeWitt. This report is dated June 5, 1943, but
was not made public until January, 1944.
- Further evidence of the Commanding General's attitude toward
individuals of Japanese ancestry is revealed in his voluntary testimony on
April 13, 1943, in San Francisco before the House Naval Affairs
Subcommittee to Investigate Congested Areas, Part 3, pp. 739-40 (78th
Cong., 1st Sess.)
- Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House
of Representatives, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., on H. R. 2701 and other bills to
expatriate certain nationals of the United States, pp. 37-42, 49-58.
- 56 Stat. 173.
- 7 Fed. Reg. 2601
- House Report No. 1809, 84th Congress, 2d session, 9 (1956).
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