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Yamamoto Isoroku (山本 五十六) (April
4,
1884 -
April 18,
1943) was the outstanding
Japanese naval commander of
World War II.
Born Takano Isoroku(高野 五十六) in
Nagaoka on
Niigata.His father is Takano Sadayoshi(高野 貞吉) who is a low class
samurai of Nagaoka-han."Isoroku"
is a old Japanese term.It means "56".56 is his fathers age in
Isoroku's birth.
He enrolled at the Naval Academy at Etajima,
Hiroshima in
1901, graduating in
1904. In
1905 during the
Russo-Japanese War, he saw action as an ensign on the cruiser
Nisshin at the
Battle of Tsushima against the Russian Baltic Fleet. At that
engagement, he lost two
fingers on his left hand (see picture on the right). After the
war he went with various ships all over the
Pacific.
In
1913, he went to the
Naval Staff College at
Tsukiji, a sign that he was being groomed for the high command.
Upon graduation in
1916, he was appointed to the staff of the Second Battle
Squadron and was adopted by the
Yamamoto family. From
1919-1921
he studied at
Harvard University. Promoted to Commander upon his return to
Japan, he taught at the staff college before being sent to the new
air-training centre at
Kasumigaura in
1924, to direct it and to learn to fly. From
1926 to
1928, he was naval attache to the Japanese embassy in
Washington, and travelled widely in the United States, which
gave him considerable insight into his opponent in the terrible war
that was to come. He was then appointed to the Naval Affairs bureau
and made Rear Admiral. He attended the
London Naval Conference in
1930. Back in Japan, he joined the Naval Aviation Bureau and
from
1933 headed the bureau and directed the entire navy air program.
In December of 1936, Yamamoto was made vice minister of the
Japanese navy, from which position he argued passionately for more
naval air power and opposed the construction of new
battleships. He also opposed the invasion of
Manchuria and the army hopes for an alliance with
Germany. When Japanese planes attacked a US gunboat on the
Yangtze River in December
1937, he apologised personally to the American ambassador. He
became the target for right-wing assassination attempts, the entire
Naval ministry had to be placed under constant guard. However on
August 30,
1939 Yamamoto was promoted to full Admiral and appointed
commander-in-chief of the entire fleet.
Yamamoto did not soften his logical anti-conflict stance when the
Japan signed the
Tripartite Pact with Germany and
Italy in September 1940. Yamamoto warned Premier
Konoe Fumimaro not to consider war with the United States: "If I
am told to fight... I shall run wild for the first six months... but
I have utterly no confidence for the second or third year." His
foresight also led him to believe that a pre-emptive strike against
US Navy forces would be vital if war did occur.
He also accurately envisaged the "island-hopping"
and air dominance tactics such a war would have, although his vision
failed him when it came to battleships, which he (in common with
most officers in the American navy, it must be conceded) still
believed to be the key component of naval force - a failing which
would be a key component of the causes for the disaster which was to
befall Japanese naval forces at Midway.
Following the invasion of
Indochina and the freezing of Japanese assets by the US in July
1941, Yamamoto won the argument over tactics and when in December
war was declared the entire First Fleet air arm under Admiral
Nagumo Chuichi was directed against the American fleet at
Pearl Harbor, attacking on December 7. With around 350 planes
launched from six carriers, eighteen American warships were sunk or
disabled. Nagumo's failure to order a second search-and-strike
against the American carriers and Yamamoto's disinclination to press
him turned a tactical victory into a strategic defeat.
In the movies
Tora! Tora! Tora! and
Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto's character says, after the attack
on Pearl Harbor, "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping
giant and fill him with a terrible resolve." Considerable doubt
exists, though, whether he actually ever said (or wrote) anything
like that; it was probably
invented for the movies, although it may well have encapsulated
some of his real feelings about it.
Yamamato directed operations for the
Battle of Java Sea on February 27-28, 1942. Without airpower
playing a significant role and fought almost entirely by cruisers
the Japanese defeated a combined force of Dutch, British, and
American ships, thereby enabling Japan to seize Java.
Yamamoto then decided on an ambitious plan to defeat the American
Pacific Fleet in a decisive battle. He chose the atoll of Midway
Island as a strategic target that if the Japanese occupied it would
draw out the American carriers. Yamamoto intended to drawn the
Americans into a ambush to destroy the carriers. Yamamoto believed
that if Japan did not soon win a decisive battle, defeat was simply
a matter of time.
Yamamoto had at his disposal a massive fleet of some 250 ships,
including eight carriers. Yamamoto's strategy was a very complex
series of feints and diversionary attacks to trap the Americans.
Unfortunately for the Japanese the Americans were well aware of the
plan. Decoded intercepts of communications meant that by the end of
May, the United States knew the date and place of the operation, as
well as the composition of the Japanese forces.
Compounding this there was poor communication on the Japanese
side, and the commanders were inadequately prepared; in addition,
the Japanese tactical disposition, dictated by outmoded doctrine
which still held battleships to be the key units, was flawed.
Viewing the aircraft carriers in part as protection for the
battleships, they were moved forward in advance of the battleship
units, which were held well back, unlike later United States
doctrine, which placed battleships around the aircraft carriers -
the true key units - as protection for them.
The
Battle of Midway, from June 4 to 6, 1942, was thus a disaster
for the Japanese, losing four carriers to the American loss of one
and 3,500 men to only around 300 American dead in another aircraft
only clash, although the luck of timing, catching the Japanese
carriers just as they were about to launch their own strike, also
played a role in the magnitude of the American victory.
Yamamoto never recovered from the defeat at Midway, although he
remained in command. He directed the Solomons campaign and realising
the strategic importance of
Battle of Guadalcanal, he initiated the efforts to remove the
American troops who had landed on August 7, 1942. Yamamoto, however,
failed to properly grasp at an early enough stage both that this
battle was key, and the magnitude of the effort that would be needed
to win. The Japanese forces suffered huge losses before he conceded
that he could not could not dislodge the Americans, whose strength
had by then grown past the point where the Japanese could possibly
prevail. On January 4, 1943, he ordered the evacuation of the
island. The actual evacuation was a tactical masterwork.
To boost morale following Guadalcanal, Yamamoto decided to make a
inspection tour throughout the South Pacific. In April 1943, U.S.
intelligence intercepted and decrypted reports of the tour. Sixteen
American
P-38 aircraft flew from Henderson Field,
Guadalcanal to ambush Yamamoto in the air. On April 18, his G4M
"Betty" transport aircraft was shot down near Kahili in
Bougainville; Yamamoto was apparently killed in the air by a
machine-gun bullet which struck his head, although there is still
some controversy over whether he was killed immediately.
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